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Inequality within intercollegiate athletics has roots as deep as the enterprise itself. 
From a macro perspective, financial inequality in intercollegiate athletics stems 
from free-market forces influencing intercollegiate athletics, specifically the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), television broadcasting, and 
the Bowl Championship Series (BCS). Because the NCAA operates on behalf of 
its member institutions, these inequalities trickle down to all conferences, uni-
versities, and athletic programs, to specific sports, and finally to student-athletes. 
The goal of this paper is to respond to Zimbalist (2013), add to the conversation 
about financial inequality in intercollegiate athletics, and describe how national 
inequalities translate into inequalities on campus. An analysis of the structure of 
intercollegiate athletics that perpetuates these inequalities is presented, Activity-
Based Costing (ABC) is introduced, and practical ideas to assist in creating a more 
financially equitable model of intercollegiate athletics are presented.
Inequality within intercollegiate athletics has roots as deep as the enterprise 
itself. From a macro perspective, financial inequality in intercollegiate athletics 
stems from free-market forces influencing intercollegiate athletics, specifically the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), television broadcasting, and the 
Bowl Championship Series (BCS). Because the NCAA operates on behalf of its 
member institutions, these inequalities trickle down to all conferences, universities, 
and athletic programs, to specific sports, and finally to student-athletes. Conference 
executives are charged with putting their member institutions in the best possible 
position for success and the free market reigns, with some conferences substan-
tially more valuable than others. The BCS operates in the best interest of the Power 
Conferences (SEC, Big Ten, Pac-12, Big 12, and ACC) and certainly considers the 
new Group of Five (Big East, Mountain West, Conference USA, MAC, and Sun 
Belt), resulting in a smaller group of conferences and institutions that are directly 
affected by their operations. But, in reality, all colleges that compete in the NCAA 
are indirectly affected by the BCS. As in any free market, many factors exist that 
affect the value of institutions and conferences, such as competitive success, geo-
graphic region, tax status, overall brand strength, history, and religious affiliation. 
Decision-making and priorities along the way are critical components of any dis-
cussion on college athletics finance, and this is where NCAA, conferences, BCS, 
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and campus leaders can make a difference for all 430,000 NCAA student-athletes 
(NCAA, n.d.-a).
The policies and procedures established by the NCAA in over 400 pages of 
text exist in part to establish a level playing field, allowing equitable access to 
competitive success for institutions and student-athletes. In recent years, the NCAA 
has specifically targeted policies related to academics, recruiting, enforcement, and 
eligibility in an effort to move toward more competitive equity. However, financial 
equity continues to be a topic that, to the public, seems taboo at the highest levels 
of decision-making. The result of over 100 years of financial inequality in intercol-
legiate athletics is competitive inequality within NCAA divisions and a structure 
that guarantees inequality will continue into the future.
Inequality is a problem in intercollegiate athletics for two main reasons: (a) 
competitive balance and (b) financial stability (Zimbalist, 2013). This is certainly 
accurate on the national scene, but how do those reasons translate to the campus 
environment? Financial stability is a major problem for most college athletic 
programs, so it remains constant. The second reason is related to the benefits of 
participation in college athletics. When there are financial inequalities at the campus 
level, the benefits of the experience are limited in some way for certain populations. 
Maybe a sport is eliminated due to financial pressures; maybe student-athletes from 
revenue sports receive benefits other student-athletes do not; maybe student-athlete 
support positions are eliminated; maybe some facilities receive more attention than 
others; or maybe marketing efforts are more focused on some sport programs than 
others. The reality is that wherever there are limited financial resources, priorities 
ultimately drive decision-making, and that almost always results in differential 
treatment and benefits.
Those campus athletic departments that find themselves in the financially weak 
category are often forced to make difficult decisions about resource allocation that 
affect sport offerings and the student-athlete experience. As Zimbalist (2013) points 
out, “strength nourishes strength and weakness feeds weakness” (p. 6). It could even 
be argued that decisions resulting in a reduced student-athlete experience—such 
as sport team elimination or the inability to fund needed academic support—are 
in direct opposition to the NCAA mission, which reads, “Our mission is to be an 
integral part of higher education and to focus on the development of our student-
athletes” (NCAA, n.d.-b, para. 5). In his 2012 State of the Association address, 
NCAA President Mark Emmert said,
What we live for is the education of our athletes. That education and athletics 
goes hand in hand, we want all of our student-athletes to be valued in all of 
our sports. While people don’t watch rowing or volleyball or fencing as much 
as they watch football or men’s basketball, that doesn’t mean we don’t value 
them as part of our enterprise. We do (Emmert, 2012, p. 9).
The NCAA mission and Emmert’s statement are difficult to reconcile with the 
inequitable financial model in place in college athletics. This is not the fault of the 
NCAA, intercollegiate athletics as a whole, broadcasters, or any one group. If the 
road to equity lay squarely with one entity, the issue would have been resolved by 
now. Instead, the culture of American sport and the perceived value of big-time 
college football and men’s basketball in a free-market economy have resulted in a 
variety of unintended yet substantial inequalities in intercollegiate athletics.
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Purpose
This paper is not an attempt to criticize or bash the NCAA, nor do I attempt to 
reconcile every possible source or consequence of the current financial model of 
intercollegiate athletics. The goal is merely to respond to the paper by Dr. Andrew 
Zimbalist (2013), add to the conversation about financial inequality in intercolle-
giate athletics, and describe how national inequalities translate into inequalities on 
campus. In the first section, I reflect upon the NCAA, conference, and BCS structure 
that result in national inequalities trickling down to campus athletic departments. 
What follows is an introduction of Activity-Based Costing (ABC) as an account-
ing method that would allow institutional athletic leaders to better understand and 
manage expenses. In the final section, I include practical revenue-generation ideas 
and budget-relieving suggestions for intercollegiate athletic leaders.
Inequality
Broadcasting, NCAA revenue distribution, and the BCS are central to any discussion 
of financial inequality in intercollegiate athletics, especially in NCAA Division I. 
Wheeler (2004) found that the basis for continuing inequities appears to be that 
the perceived rewards associated with intercollegiate athletics are impossible to 
resist. He goes on to state that the NCAA has created the conditions that lead to 
problems in football and men’s basketball (Wheeler, 2004). The current NCAA 
revenue distribution model favoring those institutions that realize success in men’s 
basketball illustrates this. Basically, college athletics mirror American capitalism 
at its finest. The free-market broadcasting agreements, the voting and decision-
making power structure of the NCAA, and the closed system of the BCS promote 
a system in which the most powerful conferences continue to receive the greatest 
share of the available revenue. Meanwhile, the remaining conferences engage in 
arguably unsustainable spending practices.
Broadcasting
Intercollegiate athletic leaders and scholars seem to agree that television reigns 
supreme, and the Power Conferences are king among all the conferences. According 
to Nielsen Media Research (2012), the SEC averaged almost 4.5 million weekly 
viewers, and the Big East averaged almost 1.9 million viewers during September 
2011. Even this difference between two large conferences demonstrates the dispar-
ity in game viewership. This makes it difficult for smaller conferences to compete 
both on a ratings level and an advertising revenue level, as higher ratings mean a 
higher advertising rate.
With the increase in the amount of content on mobile devices and the Inter-
net, Zimbalist states, “it is sensible to expect media income will either flatten or 
decrease” (2013, p. 21). Overall, this point is accurate: as more entertainment options 
become available for consumption, the audience for each gets smaller. However, 
live sporting events are still the cream of the crop because they represent a DVR-
resistant audience that is held captive by the live telecast and, thus, the commercials. 
If media income in sport were flattening out or decreasing, we would not be read-
ing about CBS increasing the average price on a 30-second commercial during the 
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Super Bowl from $3 million in 2011 to $3.5 million in 2012 and to $3.8 million in 
2013 (Dicker, 2012; Steinberg, 2012). Using the Super Bowl as an example, CBS 
has capitalized on the “second screen” environment by adding this to traditional 
television advertising revenue streams. As of December 2012, only a few digital 
inventory packages for the Super Bowl remained unsold (Steinberg, 2012). ESPN 
is also confident in its ability to see return on its $1.9 billion investments in the 
NFL, as well as $700 million in the MLB and $500 million in the BCS (Ourand, 
2012). ESPN CEO John Skipper addressed the multiplatform strategy of televi-
sion, Internet, broadband, and mobile thus: “We are not in a bubble . . . we are very 
confident we will be able to grow and absorb these costs” (Ourand, 2012, p. 39). 
The advent of monetization of social media, and maybe gaming platforms in the 
near future, clearly make this area of inquiry ripe for expansion in college athletics.
Many conferences are busy negotiating new television agreements based on 
conference realignment that took place in 2012, and some of the reported television 
revenue that is available becomes void with a change of conference membership. 
Because a lot of the movement by schools in the Power Conferences and Group of 
Five was driven by increased potential for media revenue and the ability to create 
stand-alone conference television networks, it is expected that broadcasting figures 
will increase for the Power Conferences and probably the Group of Five. This leaves 
the remaining 21 Division I conferences continuing to struggle to generate television 
revenue. There are certainly some limited television agreements with individual 
institutions and even some conferences outside of the Power Conferences and Group 
of Five, but some of those are at least partially driven by the desire to gain exposure 
for the institution and athletic program rather than revenue. The Power Confer-
ences traditionally have seen some of the largest television agreements, ranging 
from $200 million to possibly up to $500 million with the new Pac-12 agreement 
(Peloquin, 2012). To date, four of the Group of Five conferences also have been 
able to realize broadcasting revenue to aid their operations, with revenue ranging 
from $12 million to $40 million annually (Peloquin, 2012).
Live sporting events bring large sums of money through advertising to the 
networks and their affiliates because they frequently result in higher ratings than 
traditional prime-time network programming. However, even within the context of 
live sporting events, the more powerful conferences and institutions still generate 
the bulk of both advertising revenue and ratings. Since 1984 (Board of Regents vs. 
NCAA), the NCAA has been prohibited from artificially restricting football programs 
from appearing on television. This decision basically eliminated any possibility of 
continued efforts by the NCAA to more equitably distribute broadcast opportuni-
ties. Although this may seem obvious based on which games are available on the 
major networks and affiliates, it is a critical factor in explaining why the Power 
Conferences continue to far outpace all the others in broadcast revenue generation.
NCAA Distributions
NCAA President Mark Emmert (2011) eloquently stated five core values for 
decision-making across all divisions at the NCAA, including:
• Success of our student-athletes
• Student-athletes are not professionals, they are preprofessionals
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• Providing as many opportunities for as many student-athletes as possible
• Intercollegiate athletics is part of the fabric of higher education
• Dedication to enhancing and sustaining the model of collegiate athletics
The above decision-making values align well with the NCAA mission and are 
inclusive of all types of institutions, all student-athletes, and all sports. President 
Emmert has also been quoted as saying, “this is not the NFL, the NBA, it’s not a 
business” (Associated Press, 2011, para. 1). These ideals espoused by President 
Emmert are inspiring and instill great hope for the enterprise of collegiate athlet-
ics. Now, two years after these values were publicized, it is worth examining how 
NCAA revenue distribution aligns with these stated decision-making values (the 
2012–13 Revenue Distribution Plan is not available to date).
The NCAA’s revenue in 2010–11 was $845.9 million; the 2011–12 projection 
is $777 million, with $538.9 million (69%) distributed back to Division I member 
institutions or to support Division I championships, tournaments, and programs; 
$33.9 million (5%) to support Division II; and 24.7 million (3%) to support Divi-
sion III (NCAA, 2012a, 2012b). Over 80% of NCAA revenue derives from media 
rights, with the vast majority of that from the men’s basketball tournament rights 
(NCAA, 2012b). Without the men’s basketball tournament revenue, intercollegiate 
athletics would look nothing like what we see today because men’s basketball 
revenue does trickle down to touch almost every NCAA student-athlete at some 
point during their athletic careers.
Within Division I, it is interesting to examine what the 2010–11 conference 
distribution would look like using the three new groups of conferences identified 
by the BCS (Power Conferences, Group of Five, and remaining 21 conferences). 
Using these groupings and NCAA revenue distribution reports from 2010 to 11, the 
Power Conferences would have received $184.6 million (38.6%; mean of $36.9 mil-
lion per conference); the Group of Five would have received $110 million (23.0%; 
mean of $22 million per conference); and the remaining 21 conferences would 
have received $183.3 million (38.4%; mean of $8.7 million per conference). This 
does not take into account realignment, but relies on membership as of 2010–11, 
likely resulting in more equity as compared with distribution with conference 
realignment. Considering that these figures do not include any BCS money, these 
figures demonstrate considerable inequality. These differences may not seem sub-
stantial for the top schools. But for an institution that is receiving only $1 million 
in distributions, doubling that would result in an almost inconsequential loss of $1 
million for the schools at the top of the financial spectrum and a game-changing 
increase in revenue for those at the bottom. The argument does not have to rely on 
a gift of extra revenue distribution, but merely a formula by which conferences and 
institutions have the ability to generate extra revenue through achieving standards 
established by NCAA membership or other initiatives valued by the membership.
In 2011–12, $467 million was returned to the Division I membership based 
on the basketball fund (40%; $184.1 million), scholarships (26%; $122 million), 
sport sponsorship (13%; $61.4 million), student-athlete opportunity fund (10%; 
$46.5 million), academic enhancement (5%; $23.4 million), special assistance fund 
(4%; 19.7 million); conference grants (2%; $8.3 million), and supplemental support 
(<1%; $1 million). Noticeably, there is great financial incentive to win in men’s 
basketball, with 40% of the distribution calculation based on competitive success. 
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In football, the BCS controls 100% of the revenue generated, so it will be fascinat-
ing to see if there is more serious discussion by prominent basketball conferences 
to split their championship from the NCAA in an effort to control more revenue 
and thus change the nature of the NCAA we know today. With approximately 85% 
of the NCAA’s operating revenue coming from the men’s basketball tournament 
broadcast revenue (NCAA, n.d.-d), shifting that money elsewhere would cripple the 
current operation. The NCAA almost has to do whatever it can to make the powerful 
basketball conferences and schools happy to avoid such a split from occurring. In 
fact, a split from the NCAA of basketball power schools would most likely leave 
smaller conferences and institutions in a worse financial position than they are in 
now and little history or experience as a starting point to negotiate and generate 
their own revenues. As a result, commercial interests prevail and a large portion of 
revenue distribution is formulated based on men’s basketball competitive success. 
Because neither supporting men’s basketball nor winning championships is listed 
as a core value or in the NCAA mission, this seems to clash with the stated values 
and is a source of much of the financial inequality by conference.
Revenue distributed to conferences in 2010–11 ranged from a minimum of 
$1.7 million to a high of $18.5 million. Once the money has been distributed, it is 
up to conferences to allocate that money to member schools. In addition to men’s 
basketball success, the overall size of the athletic program (combining scholarships, 
number of sports sponsored, and the special assistance fund) accounts for over 89% 
of the available revenue distributed to NCAA institutions. There is an additional 
student-athlete opportunity fund (4%, $19.7 million) that is distributed based on 
sport sponsorship and scholarships, so the overall percentage might be closer to 
92% or 93%. This is actually a greater percentage than is generally accepted by 
scholars; for instance, Zimbalist (2013) indicated a net of 78.9%.
The NCAA has always claimed an unwavering commitment to academics at the 
national level as indicated by the emphasis on student-athletes being preprofessional 
(Emmert, 2011). This philosophy is also reflected in the popular media campaign 
with the tag line, “There are over 400,000 NCAA student-athletes and just about 
every one of them will go pro in something other than sports” (NCAA, n.d.-c). 
However, only 5%, or a flat $68,000 per school, of NCAA revenue distribution 
is allocated for academic enhancement. There are also no financial incentives for 
success in the classroom, but there are now penalties. Whether it is the NCAA mis-
sion, a State of the Association address by the president, or a branding campaign, 
there are inconsistencies between messaging and revenue distribution formulas.
The Bowl Championship Series
The BCS consists of a group of Power Conferences formerly known as the automatic 
qualifiers (SEC, Big Ten, Pac-12, Big 12, and ACC) and a secondary tier of confer-
ences now recognized as the Group of Five (Big East, Mountain West, Conference 
USA, MAC, and Sun Belt). In addition, Notre Dame, Army, Navy, and Brigham 
Young University are all independent Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) members. 
In November 2012, the BCS’s presidential oversight committee agreed to a new 
framework beginning in 2014. The most significant changes in the relationships 
between the two groups of conferences are that:
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• Due to conference realignment, the Big East falls out of the power conference 
group and into the Group of Five; and
• The Group of Five receives one guaranteed spot in a BCS bowl game.
The public details seem to change on a weekly basis, with the following sum-
marizing available information as of December 2012. The new ESPN television deal 
is worth $5.64 billion over 12 years or $470 million annually, although revenue esca-
lates as the contract progresses (Myerberg, 2012; Schroeder, 2012). This is thanks 
in large part to a structure that includes opportunities for 12 teams to participate 
and provides for a six-bowl rotation that will include a four-team playoff format 
(McMurphy, 2012; O’Brien, 2012; Schroeder, 2012). In addition, there will be a 
national championship game that is established through a bid process (McMurphy, 
2012). Revenue from the national championship game is anticipated to exceed $30 
million, bringing the total to over $500 million annually associated with the new 
structure (Schroeder, 2012). BCS operating expenses are estimated at $125 million 
to $150 million annually, leaving approximately $350 million to $375 million to 
distribute to FBS members (Schroeder, 2012). In addition, existing Rose, Sugar, 
and Orange Bowl conference contracts—worth over $200 million—remain intact 
(Ourand, 2012; Schroeder, 2012). Finally, the independent FBS schools receive a 
portion of the revenue as well (Schroeder, 2012).
Approximately 10% ($300,000 per school) goes prorata to FBS institutions 
that maintain a minimum Academic Progress Rate (APR; Schroeder, 2012). The 
inclusion of academic performance in the financial model is a welcome and neces-
sary piece of the puzzle, and one that, at least in part, aligns with the Knight Com-
mission recommendations (2009) that some football revenue be allocated based on 
academic performance to each FBS conference. However, the incentive to excel 
academically would be greatly enhanced if percentage allocated based on academic 
progress rates were greater or awarded on a scale by those rates.1
Solidifying a place for one school from the Group of Five in a BCS game each 
year has been portrayed as a win for the little guys (McGuire, 2012). However, 
while the guarantee of one spot creates a floor for the Group of Five, it is also 
overwhelmingly likely that it creates a ceiling of one spot. It is almost inconceiv-
able that more than one school from the Group of Five conferences will get a BCS 
bid in the new format.
Since the BCS went to a five-game format in 2006–07, at least one school from 
the current Group of Five conferences has competed each year except 2011–12.2 
However, in three seasons (2006–07, 2009–10, and 2012–13), two schools that are 
current members of the Group of Five competed in BCS bowls.3 Recent history tells 
us that it is more likely that the new deal eliminates a Group of Five school that 
otherwise would have received a BCS bid than that it provides access to a Group of 
Five school that would have been excluded in the previous model. Given the large 
amount of money at stake, the Power Conferences were happy to give up one game 
opportunity out of twelve in the new deal to prevent giving up two opportunities 
out of eight, as they have three times in the last seven years.
From a revenue distribution perspective, the new BCS structure provides more 
money to go around, which makes all FBS members at least partially satisfied at 
this point. While BCS revenue to the Group of Five and independents will increase 
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dramatically in coming years, it will do so only in relative proportion to overall 
gains. The share of total proceeds will continue to substantially favor the Power 
Conferences. MAC representative and President of Northern Illinois University 
stated that “we think it is fair . . . it does recognize that some conferences contrib-
ute more in a revenue way… from my point of view for my conference, what it 
means is more” (Schroeder, 2012, para. 15). Clearly this is a revenue increase that 
the Group of Five would be unable to generate on its own with the result being 
“more” as stated by the representative from the MAC. But the story continues to 
be that the rich get richer and the status quo is codified at least for the duration of 
the ESPN contract.
Inequalities Trickle Down to Institutions
Because the NCAA and BCS have financial formulas that benefit a small group 
of conferences, inequality trickles down to the institutions. When the impact of 
broadcasting, NCAA distributions, and the BCS are combined, it is difficult to 
see how schools from less-funded conferences will ever be able to access a larger 
share of the intercollegiate athletics industry revenue. Even if conferences have 
an equitable distribution plan internally, the amount of money they receive from 
various revenue streams makes it impossible for the national inequalities not to 
affect each campus. In Division I, institutional revenue comes largely from three 
sources: ticket sales, donations, and NCAA/conference distributions (Fulks, 2012). 
The reality is that the gaps in revenue are probably much larger than stated because 
the value of the conference brand and institutional brand is also greater for the 
more powerful conferences and school. Consequently, there are more valuable 
sponsorships, more development opportunities, and more leverage to generate new 
revenue when opportunities arise.
The result is a direct impact on campuses, both for the athletic departments 
and the universities overall. Fulks (2012) points out that allocated funds (i.e., stu-
dent fees, institutional support, and state appropriations) are strikingly different 
for FBS as compared with Football Championship Subdivision (FCS) and Divi-
sion I without football (DI w/o FB). In the FBS, 20% of total athletics revenue is 
received from the institution, compared with 71% in FCS and 77% in DI w/o FB 
(Fulks, 2012). Often this financial support can create tension between athletics and 
other university departments that also are seeking access to institutional funding 
(Eichelberger & Staley, 2011; Knight Commission, 2009). According to a Knight 
Commission report (2009), almost half of FBS presidents expressed concerns about 
how much institutional funding was directed toward athletics. Many also suggested 
that finances might result in their being forced to cut sports (Knight Commission, 
2009). There has also been recent attention placed on student fees students used 
to support athletics, with students at one institution charged $756 per year in gen-
eral fees that go toward athletics (Berkowitz, 2011). In many cases, schools have 
relied heavily on guaranteed football and basketball games to make up budget 
shortfalls. Putting football student-athletes in a position of playing against much 
bigger, stronger, and faster players is not only a financial dilemma, but an ethical 
one of which coaches and athletic directors are well aware. Balancing the need 
for revenue merely to sustain operations and the risk of injury is tough. Consider-
ation also should be given to the impact of a loss on the potential for postseason 
play that might result in new generated revenues. One athletic director at a small 
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school suggested that he was aware of the risk by stating that he examines how 
much money they can make, analyzes whether the team can be competitive, and 
considers the risk of injury and how that might jeopardize the team’s long-term 
competitive goals (Woronoff, 2012).
NCAA President Mark Emmert (Associated Press, 2011) has underscored the 
importance of funding because colleges are no longer able to subsidize athletics 
as they once did. He went on to say, “Money’s not evil. It’s what you do with the 
money that’s evil” (Associated Press, 2011, para. 8). Huma and Staurowsky (2012) 
provided data indicating that if a fair market existed for NCAA student-athletes, 
“the average FBS football and basketball player would be worth approximately 
$121,048 and $265,027 (not counting potential endorsements)” (p. 112). From 2005 
to 2008, the mean athletic spending per student-athlete at FBS schools increased 
from $61,218 to $84,446 (Knight Commission, 2010). Concurrently, academic 
spending remained relatively flat, growing from $11,079 to $13,349 per student-
athlete (Knight Commission, 2010). A divisive campus environment is harmful to 
academic and athletic endeavors because it takes the focus away from the benefits 
of both and creates an “us vs. them” environment. There is one piece of good 
news, as Fulks (2012) reported that while revenues in the FBS are becoming more 
unequal, the costs are beginning to stabilize. If this trend continues over time, there 
should be a slow reversing of the trend of gap between annual spending increases 
and revenue increases.
It is much easier to identify inequalities at the national level because the data 
are more readily available (although it is still difficult to pinpoint some areas) 
than within a campus athletic department. Nationally, funding moves from outside 
organizations to the NCAA, then to the conferences, and finally to the institutions. 
It may seem simplistic, but those schools that have more money can provide more 
to their student-athletes. Unfortunately, even at some financially flush institutions, 
there are inequities by sport that affect the experience of student-athletes. The 
drive to fund and support football and men’s basketball often results in inequitable 
experiences for other student-athletes throughout their lifecycle at the institution. It 
begins during the recruiting process, when a high-profile sport program can provide 
something as simple as a hotel room for a recruit while a sport with less funding 
has prospects bunk with current student-athletes. It is manifested in team travel 
arrangements (e.g., charter flights that require less missed class time versus com-
mercial travel), equipment quality and quantity, the ability for tutors to travel with 
teams, facilities access and quality, and even marketing support. These inequities 
could grow if multiyear scholarships and stipends for student-athletes are made 
permissible through new NCAA regulations.
It is impossible to locate publicly available financial information that is accu-
rate and comparable to conference and institutional revenue and expenses based 
on broadcasting, NCAA distributions, and the new BCS structure. Once the money 
makes its way to the campus, multiple accounting procedures are used, making it dif-
ficult to understand how financial support is divided among specific sport programs.
Intercollegiate Athletics Accounting
There is a lack of fiscal transparency and standardized reporting and accounting 
practices in intercollegiate athletics (Knight Commission, 2010; Skousen & Condie, 
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1988; Sperber, 2000; Thelin, 2000; Zimbalist, 2006). Both the Equity in Athlet-
ics Disclosure Act (EADA) and the NCAA (for Division I) require submission of 
expenses, but neither system mandates a specific accounting model. In addition, 
the NCAA data are publicly reported only in aggregate, which provides little useful 
information for campus-to-campus comparisons or overall analysis. Recently, a paid 
subscription service that provides access to a collection of financial documents and 
contracts—known as WINAD—has become very popular among athletic admin-
istrators. This is the first time there has been real transparency in the allocation of 
campus funds and the value of coaches and vendor contracts.
One result of the lack of standardized accounting practices is that few, if any, 
athletic departments employ accounting methods that allow them to analyze the 
true cost of sport sponsorship. This is especially important for those schools in 
financial positions requiring them to make difficult resource allocation decisions, 
such as elimination of sport teams, changes in staffing levels, or even the addition 
of a sport program. Using a standard accounting method would meet university 
presidents’ desire for greater transparency (Knight Commission, 2010) and allow all 
constituents to better understand costs. Presidents and athletic directors would also 
be more fully informed and be able to explain and defend tough financial decisions. 
One option to achieve more transparency and standardization is for institutional 
athletic departments to adopt Activity-Based Costing.
Activity-Based Costing
Activity-Based Costing (ABC) was developed in response to a need in manufactur-
ing to understand the resources consumed to produce a product (Cooper & Kaplan, 
1988). Today, ABC has been applied to many different industries, including airlines 
(Banker & Johnston, 1993), pharmaceuticals (Jorgensen & Edwards, 1998), gov-
ernment (Brown, Myring, & Gard, 1999), automotive retail (Booth & Balachan-
dran, 1999), universities (Granof, Platt, & Vaysman, 2000), e-retailing (Zeller, 
2000), banking (Bamber & Hughes, 2001), financial services (Byerly, Revell, & 
Davis, 2003), small manufacturing firms (Needy, Nachtmann, Roztocki, Warner, 
& Bidanda, 2003), health care (Arnaboldi & Lapsley, 2004), telecommunications 
(Major & Hopper, 2005), and community colleges (Carducci, Kisker, Chang, & 
Schirmer, 2007). In 2007, Dimitropoulos began to explore how ABC might be 
applied to sport organizations and then Lawrence, Gabriel, and Tuttle (2010) 
provided the conceptual framework for an application of ABC in intercollegiate 
athletics. In 2013, Lawrence and Gabriel tested the model using one large Division 
I institution. The implication is that ABC can be used to better understand the real 
cost of sponsoring a sport because it assigns support service costs to specific sports 
using a simple formula. There are some limitations to ABC: depreciation, capital 
expenses, auxiliary support units, and expenses managed outside of the athletic 
department remain very difficult to capture. Still, the use of ABC has the potential 
to provide more accurate expense information, financial transparency, accounting 
consistency, and better-informed decision-making in intercollegiate athletics.
Gabriel and Lawrence (2013) used academic advising at a major Division I 
institution to demonstrate the application of ABC. The institution under investiga-
tion reported expenses of $1,977,286 for academic advising in 2010. Dividing that 
figure by the number of student athletes (529) yields a cost per unit of activity of 
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$3,737.78. When those costs are reassigned to each team, football (123 student-
athletes x $3,737.78) consumes $459,747 of the expense, while women’s golf 
(9 student-athletes x $3,737.78) consumes $33,640. In other support areas, cost 
drivers such as the number of employees, attendance figures, or number of events 
can be used to allocate costs to specific sport programs. Using ABC, the true cost 
of football at this particular Division I school increased by $12.8 million, men’s 
basketball by $2.7 million, and women’s basketball by $2 million. The Gabriel 
and Lawrence (2013) study demonstrated the ability to reassign $34,231,829 of 
unallocated expenses to specific sport programs for a total of $74,361,037 assigned 
to specific sports. ABC could not account for $14,550,647 in expenses, including 
those related to camps, development housed outside of athletics, merchandise, and 
depreciation. Nevertheless, this study demonstrates that by using ABC, institutions 
do have the ability to generate expense reports that more accurately represent the 
real cost of sport sponsorship. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, there 
is a cost accounting mechanism to better understand revenues as well, which might 
help to understand the relationship between sport specific generated revenues and 
sport specific cost. By employing ABC, a greater understanding of the cost of 
sport sponsorship could be achieved, more informed decisions about adding or 
eliminating sport programs can be made, issues of gender equity would be better 
understood, the NCAA would be able to better understand how its distribution 
trickles down to support student-athletes, and more accurate academic research 
on intercollegiate finance could occur.
Closing the Financial Gap
If there were an easy solution to the financial challenges facing most NCAA 
member institutions, those schools would already be on board and addressing their 
challenges. But as such is not the case, in this section, I provide some realistic and 
practical ideas that have either a revenue-generation or budget-relieving impact.
Video Streaming and Digital Innovation
Large media rights agreements with the NCAA, BCS, and Power Conferences 
severely restrict how all other conferences and all individual institutions access 
television revenue. The lure of television exposure leads many institutions to play 
football during the week to access national or regional television airtime, sometimes 
resulting in revenue for the conference and school. However, weeknight games also 
limit access for many fans who would normally travel to a weekend game, create 
logistical issues on campus, conflict with and interrupt classes, and reinforce the 
emotional divide between academia and athletics.
The digital space provides an alternative for schools that cannot readily 
access prime television airtime, as well as the potential to generate revenue. For 
conferences and institutions without major multimedia rights agreements, digital 
streaming allows them to manage their own inventory, establish a niche, and begin 
to compete within the existing intercollegiate financial structure. This is especially 
true for small Division I FCS, Division I without Football, Division II, Division 
III, and NAIA institutions. Access to affordable video streaming provides the 
opportunity to reach their fan bases and produce a product that might even have a 
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wider reach than their larger counterparts’ efforts because the broadcast networks 
control production and reach.
Smartphone ownership jumped from 35% to 50% in 2012 and is expected 
to continue to climb (Spots n Dots, 2012). Combine that with new information 
demonstrating that almost as many Americans (236.5 million) watch television 
on their phones (although for shorter durations) as on traditional television (283.3 
million), and the digital space demands attention (Spots n Dots, 2012). When a 
university exclusively controls an Internet broadcast, it controls the commercial 
content and the commentary and can tell a more tailored story to its fans (Ryan 
Ermeling, personal communication, December 20, 2012). This creates opportunity 
to expertly weave a managed branding message throughout the broadcast. Moving 
forward, and depending on the outcome of some pending intellectual property 
lawsuits, schools that pay attention and are ready to respond might have the chance 
to further capitalize on their likenesses, images, and brand. The broadcasts can be 
offered free of charge, supported by advertising, or by paid subscription. Skeptics 
may question whether fans will access streaming games, but it is a “chicken or 
the egg” scenario. Only time will tell if an increase in the availability of streamed 
games allows schools to reach a larger audience, expand their brand reach, generate 
revenue, and connect with alumni.
The ever-changing landscape of digital media allows institutions to operate 
in a constant state of flux. As new technology arises, they are positioned to be on 
the cutting edge to produce the newest and best product possible and can take 
risks more easily and quickly than larger, more entrenched brands. A one-stop 
fan experience shop can be created that integrates live chats, blogs, Twitter feeds, 
Facebook posts, Instagram photos, and video sharing from anywhere. Many teams 
are even beginning to establish fan panels or social media hubs where fans direct 
the user-generated content and push content out on behalf of the team as well. 
As technology changes, fans will look for a more all-inclusive experience and to 
control how they are able to comment on and ingest content. In essence, fans can 
assist in brand building and creating a more valuable product for future sponsor-
ship and development opportunities. These are all things traditional broadcasts are 
not yet doing well.
Digital streaming also gives on-the-go fans access via mobile devices and 
optimization. Accessing games on mobile devices is not a new concept, but with the 
advent of mobile streaming services, this practice becomes much more widespread. 
Pavley (2012) has predicted that in the next six to 12 months, live streaming to 
mobile devices will become the norm rather than the current model of download-
ing content and viewing it later. Mobile devices provide fans access and an instant 
voice. This shift will take much of the third-party, unbiased narration out of how we 
consume media (Pavley, 2012) and a home-game-centered stream will fit right into 
this new model. Since 2008, cable and satellite providers have lost approximately 
3.58 million customers with many opting for online film and TV from services 
such as Hulu and Netflix (Graziano, 2012). Traditional networks and affiliates will 
probably have a monopoly on the major sport and entertainment events for the 
near future, but they also need to rethink the way in which they connect with their 
audience. Streaming through services like Hulu, Netflix, and Pandora give users 
instant gratification while maintaining their mobility. Users not only update their 
social media posts, but also become the story by putting their unique spin on the 
game through a variety of mobile applications.
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The digital space also provides an online community that has no boundaries. 
Imagine an Ohio University alumnus living in Japan. It would seem that this fan 
would have a geographical disconnect from celebration of Ohio University’s athletic 
program. But through the online presence that Ohio University has built, far-flung 
alumni can now watch games, engage other fans in discussion through message 
boards, provide commentary through social media channels, and relive the games 
afterward with fellow fans from Athens, Ohio, and around the world. The benefits 
of this engagement extend beyond athletics and could affect university enrollment 
and diversity, too. Traditional media can provide a viewing experience, but not the 
feeling of community that functioning in a digital space provides. The digital space 
is woefully underdeveloped in college athletics and would be a great area for the 
NCAA to give schools and conferences a financial incentive to innovate through 
grants and financial awards.
Even for conferences and schools with the potential for large television rights 
agreements, retaining streaming rights or entering into separate agreements for 
traditional broadcasting and multimedia platforms might be the most lucrative way 
to enter this market. In some respects, the major television agreements hold back 
conferences and institutions from fully realizing the value of their digital rights. For 
the majority of conferences and institutions, streaming and the digital space will 
result in financial gain, expand brand awareness and interest, provide an opportunity 
to showcase student-athletes, maintain connections with a broad alumni and fan 
base, and develop a brand image through controlled content.
NCAA Revenue Distribution and Structure
Supporters and critics (e.g., Knight Commission and The Drake Group) have made 
a variety of suggestions about how to change the NCAA’s revenue distribution 
plan. The NCAA president, Mark Emmert, has even reminded the public that the 
NCAA “is not the NFL or NBA, it is not a business” (Associated Press, 2011, para. 
1) when discussing the perception that money drives decision-making. However, 
when one carefully examines professional sport, revenue sharing through league 
collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) seems considerably more equitable than 
the NCAA model, creating a more level playing field. The smaller markets receive 
a much larger share, while bigger market teams must contribute to a revenue-
sharing pool (e.g., new NBA CBA and contributions by New York and Los Angeles 
teams). The bottom line is that the rationale in college athletics for more equitable 
revenue distribution is student-athlete welfare, a bedrock principle of the NCAA. 
Most suggestions incorporate a more equitable formula that rewards schools for 
more than just winning in men’s basketball and putting a lot of teams on the field. 
A few minor tweaks would allow the big schools to stay big and powerful while 
also allowing schools lacking such economic wherewithal to remain competitive 
and progress toward financial sustainability.
First, academics must reflect more value within the distribution model. Even 
the BCS earmarks approximately 10% of revenue to be awarded based on APR 
(Schroeder, 2012). Currently, the NCAA distributes $23 million for academics 
with no reward structure in place based on academic success. There are multiple 
measurement tools to reward schools for academic achievement using the APR 
and graduation success rate that are already commonplace in the bonus structure 
of coaching contracts. However, this conversation has been going on for almost 
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10 years, yet no progress has been made. Implementing such measures would not 
only begin to align NCAA decision-making with the core values put forth by Dr. 
Emmert, but also bring the distribution plan more in line with the NCAA’s mission.
Second, there are a variety of grant opportunities for schools within the NCAA 
(e.g., Research Grants, Women’s Basketball Marketing Grants, Limited-Resources 
Institutions Grants, CHOICES Grants, etc.), but there are no existing grants or 
financial incentives tied to innovation that will result in more self-generated revenue 
in the future. For example, using ideas from this paper, investing in new digital 
solutions and monetizing the digital presence require up-front capital and human 
resources. Institutions should be given the ability to compete for substantial grants 
that then allow them to be more entrepreneurial in their approach their operations. 
The NCAA is currently receiving quality applications for its existing grants, which 
are often in the $10,000 to $30,000/year range. Think about the type of innova-
tion that might occur with a $200,000 or $500,000 award. This is similar to small 
business start-up grants for entrepreneurs. Applicants can pitch their ideas and a 
selection committee can reward the best of the best.
Another option to create more equity is to rearrange the divisions, which was 
discussed at length within Division III a few years ago and may need to be revis-
ited. There are factors outside of Division I that will also play a role such as the 
exodus from NAIA to Division II in recent years resulting in increased Division II 
membership and setting the stage for the NCAA to be able to justify rearranging all 
divisions. In Division I, equity can more readily be achieved among peer institutions 
by formally dividing Division I into subsets based on conference alignment, revenue 
distribution, and competitive purposes. A secondary impact of creating subsets in 
Division I might be a recalibration of expected spending by institutions simply by 
establishing true peer institution groupings. Operational costs could also decrease 
if conferences were geared toward regional competition, travel, and rivalries. Much 
of the onus also falls on conference and campus leaders to understand how to use 
the NCAA monies they receive. Even if an academic incentive plan is added, 
innovative ideas are rewarded, or the structure of Division I is recalibrated, these 
changes will not positively affect all student-athletes without equitable allocation 
at the institutional level.
Third-Party Outsourcing
No matter one’s view of third-party outsourcing of intercollegiate athletics func-
tions, the reality is that it is a fast-growing segment of the industry. Consider that 
a few years ago, almost all institutions were selling their own sponsorship rights, 
tickets, and probably would have laughed at hiring a firm to conduct development 
functions. Today, the conversations and return on investment analyses are com-
monplace in many functional areas of the athletic department. Whether this trend 
will lead institutions to consider third-party management of other functions (e.g., 
compliance, operations, social media, digital inventory, academic support) is yet 
to be seen.
The advantages of outsourcing are touted as primarily financial in nature, but an 
outside firm also can bring specific expertise and experience to the institution. For 
example, existing companies provide strategic and day-to-day support to university 
fund-raising units. These companies are now seeking to enter the athletic realm. 
They bring access to massive data sets, a staff that focuses on lead generation and 
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donor cultivation, and customized support based on previous successes. Compli-
ance could be a specialization area for law firms, social media could be managed 
by marketing companies, and the professional model of facility management might 
become more prevalent in intercollegiate athletics. There might also be an inter-
mediary model that brings some athletic functions back into the fold of university 
operations while remaining outside the athletic department. For example, maybe 
athletics will return to the model of academic support provided by an institutional 
department, instead of the athletic department providing the support and then paying 
that unit to provide extra services.
Although gambling and gaming are taboo topics in intercollegiate athletics, the 
regulation of sports betting and gaming (e.g., social gaming, Zynga) is beginning to 
gain traction from a lobbying perspective in the United States. Is this bound to be 
yet another area of potential revenue for college athletic departments in the future? 
There is certainly a lot of money to be made in this space—but will the NCAA, 
conferences, and institutions be willing to be part of the conversation as state and 
federal legislation is examined?
Each institution must determine the right mix of in-house university support 
and third-party outsourcing to maximize revenue and align with the department 
mission and goals. There is not a one-size-fits-all option, but being aware of this 
growing industry segment is a must for savvy intercollegiate athletics leaders.
Summary/Implications
History often repeats itself. In intercollegiate athletics, the last two years have 
seemed eerily similar to 2003, when issues of conference membership driven by 
revenue potential, questions of academic integrity at powerful institutions, and 
criminal behavior touching an athletic program left many academics and athletic 
leaders demoralized (Wheeler, 2004). Financial inequality in intercollegiate ath-
letics will probably always exist. The focus moving forward should be on closing 
the gap and simplifying distribution methods to benefit member institutions more 
equitably. Providing support to financially weaker schools to help them generate 
more revenues and beginning to close the gap between the financially strong schools 
and the financially weak schools would improve the student-athlete experience. 
As the bedrock principle of the NCAA, the focus from the national level down to 
campuses needs to stay on the student-athlete experience. The current inequalities 
force poorer institutions to make decisions that put them at a disadvantage and 
ensure that they will not be able to compete on the highest levels, which in turn 
affects their current NCAA distributions.
In its current distribution model, the NCAA rewards schools for athletic per-
formance rather than for academic success and preprofessional training. Perhaps a 
simpler model would alleviate some of this gap, but something must be done if all 
institutions are expected to compete for the same championships and to enrich the 
student-athlete experience to its fullest. There also must be a better understanding 
of accounting practices among NCAA institutions and true analysis of how and 
where money is spent so schools understand where their dollars are going.
In the future, it will be incumbent on less-profitable NCAA institutions to 
explore alternate sources of revenue and on the NCAA to provide those member 
institutions with the ability to earn a larger share of the revenue generated. These 
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schools have always been expected to do more with less, but they must be creative 
and work smarter to create a niche and increase their profitability. A few opportu-
nities already exist in this space. The digital world is allowing smaller schools to 
produce high-quality broadcasts and create financial opportunities through adver-
tising and subscriptions services. Social media and the digital space will become a 
more integral part of athletics moving forward and smaller schools that are doing it 
well already have a leg up on their larger brethren. Strategic third-party outsourcing 
can provide support functions in a more streamlined manner with less financial risk 
and greater financial upside than current in house models.
Mostly, the importance should be placed on aligning financial policies and 
procedures with the overall mission of the NCAA and its member institutions. 
Enriching the lives of student-athletes, allowing them to compete at a high level, 
providing the support needed to become productive members of society, and ready-
ing them for careers that most likely will not include being professional athletes.
Notes
1. Beginning with 2012–13 championships, teams must earn a minimum 900 four-year APR 
or a 930 average over the most recent two years to be eligible to participate. For 2014–15 cham-
pionships, teams must earn a 930 four-year average APR or a 940 average over the most recent 
two years to participate in championships. In 2015–16 and beyond, teams must earn a four-year 
APR of 930 to compete in championships (NCAA, n.d.d.).
2. West Virginia competed in the 2011–12 Orange Bowl as a member of the Big East, but is 
now part of the Big 12.
3. In the 2006–07 season, Louisville played in the Orange Bowl and Boise State played in the 
Fiesta Bowl. In the 2009–10 season, Cincinnati played in the Sugar Bowl and Boise State played 
in the Fiesta Bowl. In the 2012–13 season, Louisville will play in the Sugar Bowl and Northern 
Illinois will play in the Orange Bowl.
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